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Abstract 
Austrian school of economics tends to identify ‘capitalism’ with the 
‘market economy’. A celebrated member of this school once warned that 
“[t]he psychological problem of why people scorn and disparage capitalism 
and call everything they dislike ‘capitalistic’ … concerns history and must be 
left to the historians.” One does not have to be a specialist in history in order 
to acquaint himself with the magnum opus of the “Pope of history”, namely 
Civilization and Capitalism of Fernand Braudel. Braudel’s full-fledged 
historical analysis comes to the amazing point that capitalism and the market 
economy are ‘exact opposites.’ Capitalists have invariably bent the 
‘spontaneous’ rules of the market so as to convert the ‘legible’ market data 
into the ‘tacit’ knowledge of the privileged few. Consequently, ‘money’ has 
served as a ‘power’ pivot rather than a mere medium of exchange, whereas 
the ‘market process’ has had to propagate wealth/power gaps apart from  
converting individual self-interests into social good. As such, our 
interpretation puts an entirely new face on liberal economic thought.  
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And Diotallevi kept interjecting, sententiously: “Historia magistra 
vitae.” To which Belbo responded: “Come on, cabalists don’t believe in 
history.” And Diotallevi invariably answered: “That’s just the point. 
Everything is repeated, in a circle. History is a master because it 
teaches us that it doesn’t exist. It’s the permutations that matter.”  
Umberto Eco (1989), Foucault’s Pendulum 
1. Introduction 
It was not accidental that the advent of industrial capitalism in its 
infancy coincided roughly with the emergence of the Scottish 
Enlightenment with its theme of laissez-faire as of the 18th century. 
Taken root in the era of late feudalism as it might have, capitalism as 
such came into sight following the mercantilist period. Ascribing the 
wealth of nations to the amount of bullion they possessed, mercantilism 
comprised across-the-board protectionist policies in international trade. 
Scottish economic philosophy then generated a seminal challenge to 
mercantilism by treating it as ‘quack medicine’ insofar as the 
developmental problems of the newly emerging nation-states were 
concerned. It was David Hume who first identified a self-defeating 
mechanism within mercantilism by means of his axiomatic version of the 
classical quantity theory of money. Attacks were then in order upon the 
state-led protectionism pertaining to mercantilist economies. When Adam 
Ferguson asserted that “[n]ations stumble upon establishments, which are 
the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design” 
(cited in Hayek, 1967: 96, fn.1), he was paving the way for the overthrow 
of interventionism and planning in the economy. In due course, Adam 
Smith came up with the appealing metaphor of an ‘invisible hand’ that 
represented the price mechanism in a free market economy as a converter 
of individual self-interests into social good. The propagation of the 
wealth of nations could not be a matter of state per se, but a natural 
outcome of competitive market forces based on individual liberty. Thus 
formulated, the Scottish tradition was bound to yield prospective 
offshoots encircled by a ‘liberal creed’ in the supremacy of design-averse 
and plan-free market orders. The essential comrade was embryonic 
capitalism, making itself a nest of cushions in the form of an urban 
renewal. The landscape of industrial capitalism and the genesis of a ‘free’ 
market economy were standing side by side. Weren’t they, indeed, two 
sides of the same coin, if not Siamese twins?  
As such, the philosophy of natural liberty, along with capitalism, has 
developed as a seminal doctrine, whereby liberal thought in economics 
has regularly found fertile ground on which to flourish. As the source of 
inspiration for several mainstream economic attitudes as well as the target 
of bitter criticism for many heterodox traditions, the doctrine of laissez-
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faire and its very implications have proven to be the dominant root of 
pros and cons. Therefore, “[i]t is no coincidence that most writings on 
economic thought either start with, or inevitably arrive at, Adam Smith” 
(Özveren, 1998: 469). Adam Smith was an intellectual leader of singular 
wit who built a system of political economy, the hard core of which still 
survives in our day. More momentously, if he lived today so as to be able 
to examine retrospectively the socio-economic course of the last two 
centuries, he would most probably come up once again with uniquely 
influential treatises, which might have entailed particular modifications 
over his previous tone. Thus, it is by no means a twist of fate that he has 
had a multiplicity of disciples. However, ‘wishful thinking’ is an 
inevitable instinct deep-seated in the essence of mankind. That is, once 
we attempt to take the veil off the disciple-led liberal thought, we will 
most likely end up discovering adulterated versions of masterpieces.  
So what? So, we may always face an ocean of concealed prejudices 
pertaining to the ‘ideology’ of economic liberalism, whenever we happen 
to inquire into socio-economic phenomena encompassed by the market 
economy cum capitalism. This being the case, we had better discover and 
utilize particular tools outside rather than within economics. For instance, 
if the embeddedness of ‘economic history’ and ‘history of economics’ is 
perceived, the former turns out to be an ideal testing ground for the 
idiosyncrasies of the latter. Market economy and capitalism have come 
out as ‘factual’ systems in human history. However, the very profession 
of economics has been, more often than not, prone to handle those 
phenomena in quite ‘fictional’ terms. The most prominent instance is the 
above-mentioned ‘liberal creed’, which has dominated our horizons all 
through the evolution of economic inquiry from the ‘invisible hand’ 
philosophers of classical political economy to the market-friendly 
mainstream economists of our times. Whether self-proclaimed or not, 
disciples of this creed have usually put forward fictional conceptions as 
intellectual background: Money as merely an accelerator of exchange, the 
market as the naturally most efficient regulator of the economy, and 
capitalism as a resultant and mirror image of the market order.  
Once they identify ‘capitalism’ with ‘the market economy’, pro-
market attitudes ascribe the virtues of the latter to the survival of the 
former. A pertinent case, worthy of analysis, is the Austrian school of 
economics. If there is anything that can be labelled as ‘ultra-liberalism’, it 
is one version of the Austrian school that deserves the attribute most. 
Therefore, insofar as an apt understanding of liberal ideology is required, 
it is a good idea to analyze this ‘eccentric’ school. Thus, it is elaborated 
in the second part. A celebrated adherent of this school once warned that 
“[t]he psychological problem of why people scorn and disparage 
capitalism and call everything they dislike ‘capitalistic’ … concerns 
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history and must be left to the historians” (Mises, 1963: 265). 
Notwithstanding that I am no historian, Austrian economics is re-
examined in an essentially history-conscious context in the third part. The 
magnum opus of the “Pope of history”, namely Civilization and 
Capitalism of Fernand Braudel, is used as the testing ground. There is 
general agreement that Braudel is a controversial figure, yet one of the 
most influential historians of the twentieth century. He has an aversion to 
capitalism; but his sympathies are with the market, so beloved of the 
Austrians. What is most fascinating as regards Braudel is that he had his 
own story to tell about ‘money’, ‘market economy’ and ‘capitalism.’ This 
grand aspect of Braudel is introduced into analysis while casting a new 
light on Austrian economics. We are well inclined to interpret Braudel’s 
work as an ideal testing ground whereby the veil on the liberal ideology 
can be taken off. As ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ are to be detached from each 
other, Austrian economics is used as a case of far-reaching liberalism, 
whereas Braudel’s ‘economic history’ is presented as a truly original 
context of anti-capitalism. I hope that the rationale behind these two 
choices will be self-evident by the end of the study.   
2. An epitome of Austrian economics 
2.1. From spontaneous origins of markets to commodity-moneys   
One peculiarity of Austrian economics concerns the conception of the 
phenomenon of ‘market’, the intellectual question as to the origin, nature 
and functioning of which remains a subject of debate. The Austrian 
notion of ‘superiority of spontaneity’, which implies the ‘inferiority of 
human design’, relies on the analysis of the market as an extraordinary 
institution, which emerges spontaneously, evolves gradually, and 
functions efficiently. From Carl Menger (the founder of the Austrian 
school in the 1870s) to Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek (the most 
influential members of the school in the second and third quarters of the 
twentieth century), the hard core continuity within the school has been 
maintained primarily by a secular adherence to an uncompromising 
stance that may be called ‘pro-marketism.’ Notwithstanding their 
particular differences, Israel Kirzner and Murray Rothbard (Mises’ 
students at New York University) along with Ludwig Lachmann and 
George Shackle (Hayek’s pupils at London School of Economics) were 
well able to maintain the current of thought involving the same domain of 
pro-marketism. In addition to their radically subjective individualism and 
essentialism, the school’s attitude towards the market has proven to be 
distinctive. It is, therefore, a good starting point to recapitulate the 
Austrian position on the emergence of markets in history. 
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As the founder of Austrian economics, Menger (1963: 152) comes up 
with a seminal proposition: Many social institutions “serve social 
interests to a high degree and the first origins of which in the great 
majority of cases can in no way be traced back to positive laws or other 
expression of intentional common will.” In this regard, Menger (1963: 
146) sets forth “the most noteworthy problem of the social sciences” as 
follows: “How can it be that institutions which serve the common welfare 
and are extremely significant for its development come into being without 
a common will directed toward establishing them”? Inspired by the 
Scottish tradition, his own solution to the problem involves a sort of 
‘invisible hand’ reasoning: While behaving purposefully so as to pursue 
their own economic interests, individuals unintentionally contribute to 
common good through a proliferation of well-being opportunities.  
In Menger’s analysis, the genesis of particular institutions (such as 
language, law, morals, localities, division of labor, money, markets and 
the state) is typified by ‘spontaneity’ as opposed to ‘human design.’ 
Spontaneous emergence of institutions relies on an ‘evolutionary’ 
causality that runs from the individual towards the social. Economic 
action at the level of individual is purposeful in the sense that it aims at 
discovering better ways of satisfying individual needs. Purposeful 
individual behavior generates unintended yet beneficial consequences at 
the level of society. Neither planned nor envisaged beforehand, such 
social consequences epitomize the Mengerian (and at large the Austrian) 
notions of spontaneity and uncertainty.  
In a study such as this, two major socio-economic institutions, the 
origins of which Menger dealt with on several connections (1892, 1963, 
1981) call for a special treatment: Markets and commodity-money. If the 
so-called ‘market economies’ of the post-feudal era have to do with the 
origins and evolution of ‘ancient’ markets and commodity-money, these 
two institutions embedded in human history should not be skimmed over. 
At this point, we had better bear in mind also that Menger’s analysis of 
the origins of monetary exchange constitutes a prototype for the eminent 
notion of ‘spontaneous orders’, which were put forward by the 
subsequent generations of the Austrian school as a rationale behind their 
uncompromising pro-marketism.  
In this construct in economic history, the division of labor and 
markets emerge spontaneously and evolve in an interrelated mode 
(Menger, 1981: 236-41). At the start, a primordial form of division of 
labor exists in the ‘isolated’ household economies. Production is based on 
self-sufficiency with no goods being produced for exchange, while a 
familial authority determines the division of labor and distribution. The 
evolutionary path launches out on a voyage of discovery at a time when 
self-interested “persons who have acquired a certain skill offer their 
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services to society and work up the raw materials of other persons for 
compensation” (Menger, 1981: 237). This is ‘production on order’, which 
is an institution entailing production-for-exchange along with its 
limitations.1 Out of the limited possibilities of production-on-order, self-
interests and individual purposes gradually pave the way for a higher 
form of exchange: “Production for uncertain future sale.” At this stage of 
economic development, producers start keeping goods in stock to meet 
demand as immediately as it occurs. Consequently, it is this latter 
institution of exchange that gives birth to ‘factories’ (mass production) 
and ‘ready-made (standardized) commodities’ (Menger, 1981: 238). All 
in all, “[t]he higher the level of civilization attained by a people and the 
more specialized the production of each economizing individual 
becomes, the wider become the foundations for economic exchanges” 
(Menger, 1981: 239). In this regard, “wider foundations for economic 
exchanges” arise primarily from “discovering better ways of satisfying 
individual needs.” Individual purposes form the basis of social 
institutions of exchange, which, in their turn, evolve so as to provide 
society’s needs in better ways. As “structures of everyday life” gradually 
reach their thresholds, self-interests amalgamate into a slow trans-
formation from self-sufficiency towards the emergence of particular 
markets, and from thenceforth towards a comprehensive market 
economy. Within these historical processes, neither collective agreement 
through positive legislation nor human design through planning has to do 
with the emergence of division of labor, of markets, and of a market 
economy. In the final analysis, purposeful individual behavior generates 
unintended yet beneficial social consequences, thus, entirely regardless of 
any common will directed towards their institutionalization.   
To be precise, “[t]he principle that leads men to exchange is the same 
principle that guides them in their economic activity as a whole; it is the 
endeavor to ensure the fullest possible satisfaction of their needs” 
(Menger, 1981: 180). It is in this way that, in Menger’s analysis, markets 
first come into being thanks to individual efforts aimed at individual 
satisfaction. Besides, markets, as serviceable and natural formations, 
enable the emergence of a ‘generalized medium of exchange’ as a 
‘natural’ by-product. Accordingly, Menger analyzes the emergence of 
money within the same context of spontaneity. At the barter stage of 
economic history, purposeful individual action is exemplified by the 
exchange of surplusses in return for deficiencies, for which there exists 
an immediate need. However, the commonplace phenomenon of ‘double 
                                                 
1  When production is on order, “[t]he consumer must still wait some time for his product, and 
is never quite certain of its properties in advance. The producer is sometimes wholly 
unengaged and at other times overburdened with orders, with the result that he is sometimes 
forced to be idle while at other times he cannot meet the demand” (Menger, 1981: 238). 
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coincidence of wants’ prevails as an obstacle to the traffic of goods in the 
‘ancient’ markets of barter. The difficulty of direct exchanges arising 
thereby acts but as a signal on the part of the most ‘perspicacious and 
ablest’ individuals, who recognize that particular wares have a higher 
demand with respect to the majority of other articles offered for 
exchange. Consequently, the more alert members of the society start 
discovering that it is to their advantage to acquire more marketable 
goods:2 “[P]ossession of more saleable goods clearly multiplies the 
chances of finding persons on the market who will offer to sell the goods 
that man needs” (Menger, 1981: 260). Specifically, more marketable 
goods can be used for immediate exchange in future, and thus yield a 
propagation of barter opportunities. It is at this point where the transition 
takes place from a pure barter system of direct exchange towards an 
impure barter system of indirect exchange. In pursuit of the fullest 
possible satisfaction of his needs, man starts using more marketable items 
as more routine media of exchange, “even when he has no direct need for 
these goods or has completely satisfied his possible need for them” 
(Menger, 1963: 152). Among the more marketable wares, individuals 
“again select those which are most easily and most economically suited to 
the function of a means of barter” (Menger, 1963: 154). Purposefully 
striving to satisfy their needs as completely as possible and unconsciously 
searching for the most ‘liquid’ of all goods, individuals unintentionally 
contribute to the eventual emergence of one commodity as the most 
marketable of all (be it cattle, cocoa beans, copper or silver) and to its 
institutionalization as a generalized medium of exchange in the form of 
commodity-money.  
As is evident, commodity-money comes into being neither as a 
product of collective will nor as an invention of state.3 In contra-
distinction, money emerges along a discovery process on the part of more 
alert individuals, who are then imitated by the rest of society through a 
                                                 
2  Menger (1892, 1981) also deals with the causes of the different degrees of marketability. 
Marketability is conditioned by such factors as the number and purchasing power of 
demanders; availability, durability, divisibility, and transportability of the good in question; 
the existence of a spatial institution of a market for the item to be exchanged, and so on.    
3  “[C]ertain commodities came to be money quite naturally, as the result of economic 
relationships that were independent of the power of the state” (Menger, 1981: 262). “[L]egal 
stipulation demonstrably had the purpose not so much of introducing a certain item as 
money, but rather the acknowledgement of an item which had already become money” 
(Menger, 1963: 153). “[B]y state recognition and state regulation, this social institution of 
money has been perfected and adjusted to the manifold and varying needs of an evolving 
commerce. … All these measures nevertheless have not first made money of the precious 
metals, but have only perfected them in their function as money” (Menger, 1892). 
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learning process.4 Emergence of a new medium of exchange along each 
sequence of discovery-and-learning is not only “typically a self-organised 
process”, but also “self-enforcing because, in each new period of 
exchange, the use of this medium is more and more efficient” (Arena and 
Gloria, 1997: 4-5). As such, Menger’s evolutionary inquiry into the 
origins of money, along with its seeming implication of ‘natural 
selection’, is of a seminal property in the history of economic analysis, 
notwithstanding the existence of contrasting assessments in the 
literature.5 Indeed, it is not only an original attempt to visualize the 
invisible hand approach pertaining to classical liberalism, but also the 
very basis of the Austrian idea of the omni-efficiency of spontaneous 
orders.    
2.2. Mises’s ‘regression theorem’ as a basis for Austrian theory of   
money 
Menger’s formative influence on economic thought is not confined to 
his analysis of the origins of social institutions in general and of money in 
particular. Menger’s reputation also relies on his leading position in the 
so-called ‘marginal revolution’ in economics during the 1870s (along 
with two contemporaneous yet independent discoverers of ‘marginal 
analysis’ in economics; namely, William Stanley Jevons and Léon 
Walras). As a challenge to the classical ‘labor theory of value’, marginal 
utility theory of value6 is presumably Menger’s most noteworthy 
contribution. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that his theory of value (of 
commodities) is revolutionary, and although his analysis of the origins of 
money is fairly original; the entirety of Menger’s work does not say much 
about the determinants of the value of and demand for money.7  
                                                 
4  “[T]here is no better means to enlighten people about their economic interests than their 
perceiving the economic successes of those who put the right means to work for attaining 
them” (Menger, 1963: 155).  
5  For instance, there is a difference of opinion between O’Driscoll (1986) and Hodgson (1992) 
on this matter. The former regards Menger’s analysis of money as a fundamental and 
enduring contribution to economics, the relevance of which is heightened by the recent work 
on the micro-foundations of monetary theory. The latter, however, provides a critique on 
account of Menger’s incomplete evolutionary perspective.  
6  For about a century from the 1770s to the 1870s, classical political economists had 
postulated that value (price) of commodities was determined by the labor-time embodied in 
the production processes. In a sense, the labor theory of value was supply-based. At this 
point, one revolutionary aspect of the utility theory of value relied on its demand-centered 
analysis, in which case the value of a commodity primarily depends on the utility to be 
derived from the consumption of that commodity.  
7  See, however, O’Driscoll (1986) who argues that Menger’s ‘methodologically subjective’ 
evolutionary approach to the emergence of money involves an explanation of the demand for 
money. From the Mengerian analysis, O’Driscoll deduces that money is perfectly liquid, and 
thus it has a special return for the liquidity services it provides. Therefore, money is 
demanded for its perfect liquidity.  
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Interestingly, however, the first comprehensive theory of the value of 
money in economic thought is discernibly traced back to another 
influential Austrian economist: Ludwig von Mises, the author of a 
treatise on money as early as 1912. Starting from Menger’s (subjective) 
utility theory of value, Mises arrives at the axiom that, like the value of 
all other commodities, the value of money is also determined by its 
marginal utility. Furthermore, thanks to his so-called ‘regression 
theorem’, Mises is even one of the first economists to emphasize a 
‘historical’ component in the determination of the value of money. And 
most remarkably, Mises’s utility-oriented effort to historically explain the 
value of money not only brings about a fortification on the part of 
Menger’s exposition of the emergence of money, but also forms the basis 
of Hayek’s memorable contributions to the monetary theory of business 
cycles.  
In accordance with his ‘praxeology’,8 Mises inquires into all 
economic phenomena relying on the subjectiveness of individual 
preferences. For instance, each and every individual has a ‘subjective’ 
preference for holding money as well as for consuming commodities. 
Individuals assign a ‘specific’ utility scale to particular amounts of 
money, just as they do for particular commodities. Subjective utility 
scales as such yield an objective value of money on the market in the 
form of actual ‘purchasing power’, which corresponds to the value (or 
price) of money. And, what essentially distinguishes a commodity from 
money is the fact that the former is ‘useful’ in itself. Individuals value 
and demand commodities for their ‘direct use’ in consumption. But 
money is not useful in itself; it is useful since it possesses a ‘prior’ 
exchange value. Individuals know that money has been useful in the past 
as a medium of exchange, and hence that it will keep this property of 
exchangeability in the future. Accordingly, individuals derive utility from 
money due to its price (or purchasing power) that has been already 
established. In other words, defying a consumption use, money is valued 
and demanded for its time-honored purchasing power that confers a 
property of intertemporal exchangeability. “But if the demand for, and 
hence the utility of, money depends on its preexisting price or purchasing 
power, how then can that price be explained by the demand”? (Rothbard, 
1976: 168). Or the other way round, if the price of money is to be 
explained by the utility it provides (as postulated by the utility theory of 
value), how can it be that the utility of money is postulated to depend on 
the very same price? This seemingly awkward aspect of Mises’s 
application of utility theory of value to the explanation of the purchasing 
                                                 
8  Praxeology, as a key-term in Misesian lines, can be shortly defined as the most appropriate 
‘science of human action’ for analyzing economic phenomena. Its hard core properties entail 
a priorism and value-freeness (Wertfreiheit) along with an unconditional subjectivism.    
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power (price) of money is known as the ‘circularity problem’ or the 
‘Austrian circle.’ Mises, however, claims to overcome this circular trap 
by means of his regression theorem (Mises, 1953: 97-123; and 1963:  
408-16).  
That individuals derive utility from money due to its intertemporal 
exchangeability is indicative of an important ‘historical’ component that 
contributes to the determination of the value of money. People demand 
money since they derive utility from money; and they derive utility from 
money thanks to its preexisting purchasing power. To illustrate, money 
provides utility and thus is demanded on a Wednesday because it had 
purchasing power on Tuesday. The purchasing power of money on 
Tuesday is determined by the interaction of the supply of and demand for 
money on that Tuesday. Demand for money on Tuesday is determined by 
the purchasing power of money on Monday, which, in turn, is determined 
by again the interaction of supply of and demand for money on that 
Monday. Demand for money on Monday again depends on the 
purchasing power of money on Sunday. In sum, today’s demand for 
money is determined by yesterday’s purchasing power of money, which 
in turn is partially determined by yesterday’s demand, which in turn is 
determined by the purchasing power the day before, and so forth. In the 
context of this regression, Mises pushes back this historical determination 
process to the last day when the commodity-money (say, gold) was 
demanded solely for its own direct consumption use since the historical 
component in the demand for the commodity-money vanishes on that last 
day of pure barter. The regression, thus, comes to an end when the 
commodity-money ceases to have a preexisting purchasing power as a 
medium of exchange. Before and on the last day of pure barter, the 
commodity-money under consideration is demanded for only its 
consumption use; it is valued as a commodity only. On and after the day 
the commodity-money is for the first time used as a medium of exchange, 
it assumes a ‘monetary’ value along with its prior consumption use. Only 
after the individuals start deriving utility from the commodity-money as a 
medium of exchange, only then can it possess a value (price) in the form 
of purchasing power.  
It is in this way that Mises blends utility theory of value and 
emergence of money in a historical context. On the one hand, he relates 
“the ability of individuals to assess the marginal utility of the money unit 
to this historical process” (Vaughn, 1994: 40). On the other, he lays bare 
that money must have emerged on the ‘ancient’ markets as once Menger 
envisaged.9 Rothbard (1976: 169) faithfully praises the explanatory 
                                                 
9  See Mises (1963: 405-7) for his epistemological account of Menger’s analysis of the origins 
of money.  
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power of Mises’s regression theorem for revealing that “Menger’s 
historical insight into the way in which money arose on the market was 
not simply a historical summary but a theoretical necessity.” Mises’s 
utility theory of the value of money, thus, shows up as a further step in 
conceptualizing money as an institution ‘spontaneously’ emerging out of 
‘spontaneously’ evolving barter markets. In essence, the peculiar edifice 
of the Austrian background is so constituted: True parents of such social 
institutions as markets and money cannot be found in collective human 
design, but must be traced back to purposeful individual action.   
2.3. Non-neutrality of money and Hayek’s monetary explanation 
of business cycles 
From this spontaneity-centered Mengerian-Misesian background, it 
may easily follow that if some phenomena owe their existence to 
complex ‘natural’ processes involving no human calculation and design, 
then it is simply impossible to have adequate wisdom to alter and re-
design them in a fully conscious manner. And if this statement is taken to 
be bare truth, such institutions as markets, money and the market 
economy must accordingly be exempt from design, regulation, and 
planning. However, Menger himself was cautious as to an idea such as 
this.10 For instance, he was in agreement with Adam Smith’s proposals 
concerning the acts of intervention for the sake of the poor.11 
Nevertheless, Menger’s reservations as such were somewhat neglected by 
some of his adherents such as Mises and Hayek. That the Austrian school 
is predominantly identified by a tenet of categorical pro-marketism owes 
much more to these two figures than to the founder of the school. The 
Austrian creed that the benevolence of an unregulated market order 
dictates the malevolence of any kind of planning and regulation finds its 
best expressions in Mises’s insistence on the non-neutrality of money and 
Hayek’s resolute attitude towards the detrimental consequences of 
premeditated monetary policy and ‘artificial’ credit expansion. 
                                                 
10 This cautiousness of Menger corresponds to what Prisching (1989: 49) terms ‘Menger's 
balance.’ Prisching’s contention is that Menger had explicit reservations for the motto that 
spontaneously emerging institutions legitimate a laissez-faire model thanks to the ‘higher 
wisdom’ they bear. Menger's attitude was that of a ‘balanced interventionism’ in the form of 
a warning about the preconception that institutions of spontaneous origin and nature always 
foster welfare better than regulation and planning. For a somewhat different view, see 
Streissler (1990) who indicates that Menger put much more confidence in the market, as 
opposed to state interventionism, insofar as the provision of the needs of society is 
concerned. 
11 At times, Menger was quite clear in this connection: “A statesman, he [Menger] confirmed, 
who is afraid to reform law to promote welfare because it is of organic [spontaneous] origin, 
is similar to a farmer, an engineer or a physician who abstains from intervening in the 
natural organic process because of his admiration of the high wisdom which is deployed by 
nature” (Prisching, 1989: 49).  
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In history of economics, and dating back to classical political 
economy, ‘neutrality of money’ meant that money does not matter. Not 
only monetarists and Walrasian neoclassical economists, but also 
Keynesians have subscribed to this notion, which implies that monetary 
changes have no ‘real’ economic effects (at least in the long run). 
According to this doctrine, money has an impact on neither relative prices 
nor composition of output; and changes in monetary aggregates can only 
affect the aggregate price level leaving the real sector of the economy 
intact. In this regard, one major premise of Austrian economics is its 
rejection of neutrality of money. First of all, in the context of Austrian 
perception, it is by no means appropriate to speak of an aggregate or 
unitary price level since purchasing power of money can only be defined 
over a heterogeneous array of commodities. Moreover, each and every 
individual has a strictly subjective value scale for each and every 
commodity. Therefore, an x percent increase in the money supply is 
extremely unlikely to yield an x percent increase in the price of each and 
every commodity. Any change in money supply will alter the 
composition of the array comprising the purchasing power of money. In 
other words, monetary changes do not influence all prices uniformly 
(Mises, 1963: 398-99). As Mises insists, “an increased supply of money 
impinges differently upon different spheres of the market and thereby 
ineluctably changes relative prices” (Rothbard, 1976: 163). To be sure, 
once the neutrality of money (along with the quantity theory of money) is 
so rejected, the impact of deliberate monetary intervention on the 
economy shows up as a priority item to be analyzed.  
Mises’s contention at this point is full of warning as he postulates 
that government-led monetary changes generate permanently ‘real’ 
distortions in the distribution of income and wealth (Mises, 1953:       
139-45). To Mises, money creation by the government (accompanied by 
the banking system) is not an unbiased process, but aims at re-directing 
spending towards pre-determined or ‘favored’ sectors. As such, 
expenditure-switching involves establishment of specific privileges to 
particular segments of the society. As the demand for pre-determined 
commodities increases, their prices rise quicker and more than those of 
others. In this sense, those who receive the new money earlier benefit at 
the expense of two larger groups: i) those who receive the new money 
later, and ii) fixed income groups receiving no new money at all. Hence, 
the re-distribution of income and wealth through money creation is a 
zero-sum game. Government-led changes in the money supply constitute 
a biased policy towards the most powerful and thus the most favored tiny 
portion of the society. ‘Cash-induced’ adjustments in purchasing power 
are appetizing merely on the part of those who enjoy the privilege of 
receiving the new money earlier (Mises, 1963: 421). In this connection, 
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Mises’s well-known aversion to concentration of economic power in the 
hands of the state and state-favored groups is self-evident. In accordance 
with the Austrian trait, it is of course no surprise that Mises passionately 
favors the free operation of the competitive market forces that diffuse 
power uniformly. Consequently, one presumable interpretation of 
Mises’s standpoint is that so long as the money supply is controlled and 
regulated by the government and the banking system, a privileged 
fraction will keep thriving on the shoulders of the remainder of the 
society.  
Relying largely on Mises’s earlier works on money, Hayek’s theory 
of capital (1941) in connection with his approach to bank credit 
expansion forms a delineation of monetary phenomena. It is this portion 
of Hayek’s grand research agenda that reveals him to be an opponent of 
the Keynesian thesis. Notwithstanding Keynes’s overwhelming impact on 
macroeconomic theory and policy after the Great Depression of 1929, 
Hayekian assertions on the distortionary effects of credit expansion are 
worth considering. Revival of the liberal creed during late 1970s and 
early 1980s owes a great deal to Hayek’s contributions in this respect.   
For Hayek, ‘appropriate’ economic growth results from ‘voluntary’ 
saving in the economy, and not from an ‘artificial’ expansion of credit. It 
is the saving that determines the ‘natural’ rate of interest, whereas new 
bank credit leads the interest rate to fall below its natural level. This, in 
turn, paves the way for a sort of illusion on the part of producers, who 
erroneously start thinking that interest rates have fallen due to a decreased 
demand for consumer goods associated with an increased propensity to 
save. Investment is, thus, stimulated at the expense of the production of 
consumer goods. The misleading influence of a credit boom yields a 
mismatch between the expectations of producers and consumers (Hayek, 
1975: 3-71; 1948: 220-54; 1978a: 165-78). In Hayek’s analysis, it is this 
mal-investment process that basically causes economic crises. 
Consequently, this artificially initiated yet spontaneously operating 
process gives birth to detrimental economic fluctuations in the form of 
business cycles.  
In this connection, expectations of the agents in the economy 
constitute the central theme in Hayek’s theory of business cycles. Agents 
form expectations and take decisions by observing the signals provided 
by the price mechanism. The ‘natural’ operation of the price mechanism, 
which properly coordinates the economy as a whole, generates correct 
relative prices as signals to be observed by the agents. However, artificial 
credit expansion distorts this spontaneous-and-efficient process by 
spawning flawed signals in the form of a hallucinatory availability of 
credit in the system. Misapprehension created on the part of agents gives 
way to the formation of wrong expectations, the result being the 
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incompatibility of the decisions of savers and investors on the one side, 
and of producers and consumers on the other. The self-coordination of 
the economy is thus dismantled through monetary interventionism. In this 
respect, the implication of Hayek’s theory of business cycles is an 
extension of Mises’s repugnance for the concentration of economic 
power in a few hands favored and sustained by the state apparatus. Unless 
competitive market forces are allowed to diffuse power uniformly and 
disseminate correct information throughout the economy, economic 
crises will keep hitting the bulk of society: 
To summarize: Under the impact of a monetary disturbance, prices 
will transmit misinformation. The revelation of this misinformation 
and its correction constitute a recession. The abnormal rise in losses 
and unemployment is the counterpart to the misallocations created by 
the misinformation. In short, monetary expansion and recession are 
inseparable! (O’Driscoll and Shenoy, 1976: 205).12  
2.4. Socialist calculation debate and market order as a dynamic 
process  
As should be clear now, Mises and Hayek together lead the peculiar 
liberalism of the Austrian school. Apart from their meticulous 
involvement in monetary matters, their participation in the renowned 
‘socialist calculation debate’ is supremely relevant insofar as the chief 
characteristics of the Austrian school is to be comprehended. Scrutinizing 
the possibility of rational “economic calculation in the socialist 
                                                 
12 At this point, one exemplary application of the Austrian theory of money can be found in 
Rothbard’s (1963) subscription to the Misesian-Hayekian domain of inquiry. While 
accounting for the collapse of the US stock market in 1929 and analyzing the protraction of 
the ensuing Great Depression, Rothbard exhibits a discernible Austrian mannerism. His 
contention is that the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policy throughout the 1920s 
had culminated in a credit boom that eventually gave birth to the well-known crisis of the 
1930s, during which Herbert Hoover’s precautionary measures to avoid unemployment and 
bankruptcies turned out to yield adverse outcomes. Rothbard’s thesis is truly Austrian in the 
sense that the big bang in the financial sector and its real consequences thereafter were both 
attributed to ‘interventionist policies’ as opposed to the built-in inclination of the market 
system towards self-correction. Furthermore, following the ‘stagflationary’ 1970s that threw 
serious discredit on the instrumentality of Keynesianism, the Misesian-Hayekian agenda, 
during the neo-liberal 1980s and onwards, has been quite successful in engendering studies 
on monetary issues that are essentially Austrian in spirit (Vaughn, 1994: 116-7). For 
instance, Lawrance White’s (1984, 1989) insistence on the defective nature of central bank 
policies sounded rather meaningful especially in the light of Hayek’s (1978b) interesting 
proposal for the “denationalization of money” in the form of freely competing currencies. In 
line with the Austrian creed of the superiority of spontaneity, White’s student George Selgin 
(1988) was then able to put forward the evolutionary dynamics that would generate a 
serviceable banking system without having any recourse to government action. It was 
Selgin’s student Steven Horwitz (1992) who kept elaborating on the same issue while 
following in the footsteps of Mises and Hayek.  
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commonwealth” in 1922, Mises13 initiated a debate that would extend 
over several decades. The socialist side of the debate responded through 
the works of such figures as O. Lange, F. M. Taylor, H. D. Dickinson and 
A. Lerner.14 Most importantly, however, a considerable portion Hayek’s 
life can be said to be devoted to repulse socialist-oriented ideas and to 
embellish his hypotheses on the virtues of a spontaneous market order. 
His philosophical focus on socialism, liberalism and market order 
culminated into a huge series of works (e.g., 1935, 1944, 1948, 1960, 
1973, 1976, 1979, 1988), which carried him to the status of one of the 
most prolific political economists of the twentieth century. The Nobel 
Prize he was given in 1974, thus, was no surprise.  
In this connection, both Mises and Hayek deem a freely operating 
market system, as opposed to central planning, the best and the most 
efficient order among alternatives. Rational economic decisions can only 
be based on market data, which are by no means given. According to this 
Austrian stance, “[a]ctors do not calculate with ready-made information, 
they have to anticipate, speculate, interpret and ‘feel’ future 
developments” (Prisching, 1989: 53). The price mechanism of the market 
economy serves to integrate “individual-subjective appraisals in a world 
of uncertainty and permanent change.” The central authority of a socialist 
polity cannot simulate the efficiency of a spontaneous market order. A 
central planning bureau entails the overthrow of the vociferously complex 
yet efficiently disseminated market coordination. As such, socialism is an 
annihilation de facto of the spontaneous price signals, without which 
economic calculation vanishes. This being the case, neither allocation of 
resources nor distribution of incomes and commodities can be channeled 
into efficient use under central planning. Hence, to Mises (1935), rational 
operation of the economy is impossible in a socialist order. Besides 
socialist appeals, Mises also refutes another intervention-oriented idea, 
which pleads for a ‘balanced’ involvement of the state instead of a 
comprehensive planning of socio-economic institutions.15 He shows up 
                                                 
13 This famous article by Mises (“Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth”) was 
translated from its German original and reprinted in Hayek (1935).  
14 A thorough examination of the socialist calculation debate can be found in Vaughn (1980). 
The reflections of this relatively old debate have culminated into a lively area of research 
until recently. Feasibility of socialism along with the idea of ‘market socialism’ has been 
widely discussed. On this matter, some of the most prominent studies are: Bradhan and 
Roemer (1993, 1994), Stiglitz (1994), Adaman and Devine (1996, 1997), Milonakis (2003), 
Lo and Smyth (2004).  
15 The rationale behind this idea is the necessity of a ‘third option’ that is suggestive of “a free 
economic process regulated by political intervention” (Prisching, 1989: 55). Without any 
alterations in the status quo in terms of private and collective property, this scheme had its 
roots in the 19th century. Kathedersozialisten in Germany and Wiener Fabier in Austria, as 
distinguished from both the liberals and revolutionary socialists, were the antecedents of 
such reformist and revisionist theories.    
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again as a decided dissenter owing to his belief that socialism is the most 
likely heir of balanced interventionism as such. In a similar vein, Hayek 
considers balanced interventionism, as well as purely socialist practices, 
detrimental to individual freedom. Hayek’s rejection of a centrally 
planned economy finds its best expression in his praise of a ‘spontaneous 
order’, the sole raison d'être of which is to embolden and facilitate the 
materialization of individual purposes. He identifies a spontaneous order 
with individual liberty and refuses design and planning at the social level. 
Even though Hayek tends to accept the possibility of rational economic 
calculation under socialism, he nevertheless insists on the incompatibility 
of socialism and democracy.16 In this sense, survival of a market order, 
characterized by free competition, is indispensable to individual liberty in 
Hayek’s analysis. To him, any intrusion on the self-orderly and 
competitive socio-economic intercourse paves the way for the overthrow 
of liberty and for the erection of authoritarian polities. Destruction of 
individual freedom as such constitutes a dangerous “road to serfdom” 
(Hayek, 1944).17 All in all, it is Hayek’s fundamental endeavor to impose 
a spontaneous market order as the most benevolent economic co-
ordination mechanism, which therefore calls for elaboration.  
A peculiar characteristic of Austrian economics is its ‘radically 
subjectivist’ individualism, which is especially distinctive with respect to 
the ‘perfect knowledge models’ of orthodox economics. The (unrealistic) 
assumption of perfect knowledge entails two (fictional) outcomes: i) 
existence of economic agents as representative decision-makers in terms 
of their uniform expectations and valuations, and ii) lack of uncertainty 
since agents, by definition and construction, have complete access to all 
pertinent information. This is inevitably an ‘economics of equilibrium’ 
arising from ‘objective’ agent decisions in the idealistic world of 
certainty (Hayek, 1948: 60). Austrian insistence on the essentially 
subjective nature of individual decisions, however, renders economic 
analysis an ‘economics of disequilibria’ in the face of uncertainties (and 
imperfect knowledge) owing to ever-evolving market processes (Hayek, 
1948: 42, 77-91). To Hayek, the market is efficient yet imperfect on the 
one hand, and economics is a science that basically deals with a 
coordination problem on the other. Therefore, market knowledge, which 
                                                 
16 In fact, it has remained a subject of unsolved debate whether Hayek tended to accept the 
possibility of rational economic calculation under socialism. However, it can be more safely 
noted that “Mises considered the consistency of a social institution [central planning], Hayek 
rather the compatibility of two different institutions [democracy and central planning]” 
(Prisching, 1989: 53). 
17 Moreover, to Hayek, “[b]oth principles, planning and competition, became bad and blunt 
instruments if they are incomplete. They are mutually excluding principles for solving the 
same problem, and a mixture of both means that neither will function and the result will be 
worse than if one had relied on one of them” (Prisching, 1989: 58). 
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enables economic calculation and rational decision-making, is essentially 
‘tacit.’ The tacit nature of market knowledge in Hayek’s work implies an 
ever-prevalent ‘uncertainty’ in the market. With perfect knowledge, 
agents would already know everything by assumption; that is, there 
would be nothing to be discovered. However, introduction of 
‘uncertainty’ renders the market a process of discovery and learning 
through trial and error.  
In this Hayekian (and at large Austrian) context, competitive 
operation of the market creates convergences towards equilibrium. Yet 
whether equilibrium is eventually reached or not is of secondary 
importance. It is the dynamic search for equilibrium that makes the 
market a process as opposed to the static concept that always ends up 
with Walrasian equilibrium. Tacit market knowledge is fairly dispersed in 
the economy, and the price mechanism organizes this knowledge into a 
‘legible’ format. Market participants are to discover and interpret the 
informative signals provided by the price mechanism, without which the 
knowledge-in-question remains ‘illegible’ as if it were a foreign 
language. What translates it into economy's native language is the price 
mechanism. Hence, it is thanks to the price mechanism that participants 
are able to communicate, and thus the market process is automatically 
coordinated. Consequently, if it were well organized, central planning 
could simulate the Walrasian static equilibrium thanks to full information 
that necessitates no discoveries. However, that sort of a conception of 
economic coordination is a complete abstraction separated from the 
reality. To Hayek, what planning cannot simulate is the dynamism of the 
discovery process, which runs spontaneously. It is this spontaneity that 
makes the market a benevolent institution, which is singled out by an 
intricate orderliness (Özveren, 1997).  
Springing from Mises and Hayek, the relationship between 
uncertainty and the market process has been emphasized most notably 
through the works of Israel Kirzner. He has consistently conceptualized 
the market as an entrepreneurial process, whereas the role of the 
entrepreneur is to eliminate or alleviate the disequilibria in the market 
(Kirzner, 1973). This process is “continually modifying, disrupting, and 
adjusting the market phenomena that govern the decisions of the market 
participants” (Kirzner, 1963: 105). At this point, the embeddedness of the 
market and uncertainty shows up as a crucial notion: “Even the known 
alternative courses of action the individual ‘producer’ is able to choose 
from … are by no means certain in their outcomes. … To some extent, in 
fact, every course of activity open to him leaves some range of 
uncertainty concerning the outcome” (Kirzner, 1963: 144). Thus, risk 
constitutes the essence of decisions taken within the market, and “to 
speak about such decisions as if they were made in a world without 
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uncertainty would be self-contradictory” (Kirzner, 1963: 17). Besides, the 
market is efficient since it provides its participants with “a process that is 
ceaselessly at work tending to prevent waste from being perpetuated and 
from being carried too far” (Kirzner, 1963: 308-9). In this sense, the 
market operates efficiently in such a way as to convert the cloudy 
medium of uncertainties into a much more secure medium through which 
entrepreneurs can “anticipate, speculate, interpret and ‘feel’ future 
developments.” Thus, in Kirzner’s analysis in particular, and in Austrian 
economics in general, the ability to speculate is a ‘virtue’ that pertains to 
the market per se: “[T]he decision to buy a bundle of productive 
resources at one price in order to resell ‘them’ … later at a higher price, is 
essentially speculative. In a market there is constant opportunity for this 
kind of decision to be made….” (Kirzner, 1963: 17-18). Market is an 
extraordinary institution in this Austrian context, within which pro-
marketism keeps on cheering to the echo: “A market economy, even the 
purest of pure, can never be a utopia” (Kirzner, 1963: 308).  
3. Rethinking Austrian economics in the light of Braudel’s 
‘economic history’ 
3.1. Origin and nature of markets and monies 
The three-volume book by Braudel (1981, 1982, 1984), Civilization 
and Capitalism: 15th - 18th Century, is simply admirable, and needs no 
praise. The whole Braudellian analysis is built around an edifice of three 
storeys: The ‘material life’ at the basement, then the ‘market economy’ in 
the middle, and the ‘true home of capitalism’ at the ‘commanding 
heights.’18 Within this analytical construction, ‘power’ concentrates at the 
top, ‘economic life’ takes place in the middle, and ‘self-sufficiency’ 
prevails at the bottom. These three layers, which co-exist in time and 
space, are in constant interaction with each other throughout history; that 
is, segments of each may transform the structures of others over time. 
Therefore, their relative sizes change as time passes and geographies 
differ. At this point, at least for the Europe of fifteenth-to-eighteenth 
centuries, Braudel’s demarcation among these three levels in terms of a 
monetary segregation is quite interesting:  
Europe stood alone and was already something of a monetary 
monster. It experienced the whole gamut of currency experience. On 
the lowest level, and to a greater extent than is usually believed, were 
barter, self-sufficiency and primitive money–old expedients, indirect 
                                                 
18 For those who are unfamiliar with Braudel, it may be astonishing to suddenly come across a 
marked division between the market economy and capitalism. For the time being, it suffices 
to note that this distinction constitutes the hard core of the economic history made in 
Braudel’s mind.  
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means of economizing on specie. At a higher level came relatively 
plentiful supplies of metallic money–gold, silver and copper. Finally 
there were many kinds of credit, from the pawnbroking activities of 
the Lombards and Jewish merchants to the bills of exchange and 
speculation of the great trading centers (Braudel, 1981: 457). 
Here, we encounter a temporal and spatial conception of three 
distinct spheres of human action in terms of the use of specific media of 
exchange. As we move from the bottom towards the top, the media of 
exchange show up in more ‘mature’ forms. If we allow enough time to 
pass within each level, it is reasonable to expect higher forms of 
exchange to evolve. Therefore, in the first place, one had better keep in 
mind that Braudel’s three-storey edifice, by way of which he 
conceptualizes the socio-economic life of humanity, involves a sort of 
monetary evolution in time as well as in space.    
In Braudel’s analysis, the transformation from the bottom to the 
middle layer (from material towards economic life) is gradual since 
material life entails slow rhythms: 
Ever-present, all-pervasive, repetitive, material life is run according 
to routine: people go on sowing wheat as they always have done, 
planting maize as they always have done, terracing the paddy-fields 
as they always have done, sailing in the Red Sea as they always have 
done … And material civilization has to be portrayed … alongside 
that economic civilization … which co-exists with it, disturbs it and 
explains it a contrario … This double register (economic and 
material) is in fact the product of a multisecular process of evolution. 
… Since the process began, there has been coexistence of the upper 
and lower levels, with endless variation in their respective volumes 
(Braudel, 1981: 28).  
In this regard, in Braudel’s lengthy discussions of the formation of 
towns or cities all over the world, one can detect the pre-dominance of a 
spontaneous emergence and gradual evolution of markets out of social 
necessity. When the ‘limits of the possible’ are reached in material life, a 
transition starts towards the economic life. Indeed, when the 
sustainability of self-sufficiency can no more be maintained, the social 
mechanism starts to give birth to a market economy. Unsustainability of 
self-sufficiency forces the social mechanism to find a way out. In other 
words, inadequacy of the existing livelihood possibilities generates the 
way out in the form of a gradual transformation from material to 
economic life. Towns, as spatial institutions, are crucial within this 
process: 
Where there is a town, there will be division of labor, and where 
there is any marked division of labor, there will be a town. No town 
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is without its market, and there can be no regional or national 
markets without towns (Braudel, 1981: 479-81).  
But the decisive step in this long history was taken when the town 
appropriated these hitherto modest little markets … A city, once it 
reached a certain size was unable to live off the immediate 
neighbourhood, usually dry, stony and infertile. It became necessary 
to look further afield, as the Italian city-states were already doing by 
the twelfth century, and even earlier. Who was to feed Venice, since 
the city had never had more than a few poor gardens reclaimed from 
the sands? (Braudel, 1982: 228, emphasis added).  
Not surprisingly, within this transformation processes, the evolution 
of ‘money’ accompanies that of the markets. In human history, “[a] 
rudimentary form of money appears as soon as commodities are 
exchanged. A more sought-after19 or more plentiful commodity plays or 
tries the part of money, the standard of exchange” (Braudel, 1981: 442, 
emphasis added). Such ‘more sought-after’ or relatively abundant 
commodities, which served as media of exchange in human history, 
exhibit a great variety including, for instance, salt, cotton cloth, copper 
bracelets, gold dust, horses, sea-shells, dried fish, furs, and even slaves 
(Braudel, 1981: 442-3). Archaic though they might have been, those 
forms of media of exchange were well able to facilitate and intensify the 
market transactions then: “[O]ne is obliged to conclude that primitive 
currencies were indeed forms of money, with all the appearances and 
properties of money” (Braudel, 1981: 444). As the markets evolved, 
monies did the same, and vice versa. Put differently, “[b]arter remained 
the general rule over enormous areas between the fifteenth and eighteenth 
centuries. But whenever the occasion demanded, it was eked out, as a sort 
of first step towards money, by the circulation of currencies, such as 
cowrie shells” (Braudel, 1981: 439). The dual evolution of these two 
institutions was basically driven by the augmenting set of necessities of 
the evolving society: “Money only becomes established where men need 
it and can bear the cost. Its flexibility and complexity are functions of the 
flexibility and complexity of the economy that it brings into being” 
(Braudel, 1981: 439).  
Such a conception of the emergence of the markets (along with that 
of money) is most likely to suggest a spontaneous process. If it were 
possible (or workable) that the transformations had involved conscious 
human design, the consequences would be obtained presumably much 
more rapidly. At this point, Braudel’s conception of the emergence of the 
markets is quite akin to that of the above-discussed Mengerian (and thus, 
                                                 
19 Note the similarity with Menger’s terminology, where “more marketable (saleable)” 
commodities eventually turn out to be generalized media of exchange on the market.  
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at large, Austrian) analysis. The Mengerian sequence that runs from ‘self-
sufficiency’ to ‘production on order’, and thenceforth to ‘production for 
future sale’ is compatible with Braudel’s historical-evolutionary 
reasoning. In Menger, it is the problematic nature of self-sufficiency that 
generates a new way of exchange in the form of production on order; and 
again the problematic nature of production on order that yields 
production for future sale and a market economy, and so forth. The 
notion of problematic nature, here, corresponds to what Braudel terms 
the ‘limits of the possible’, which, in its turn, is the primum mobile of the 
‘multisecular process of evolution’ from material to economic life.  
Moreover, and quite strikingly, the embeddedness of the evolution of 
‘markets’ together with ‘money’, as manifest in Mengerian analysis, can 
also find support in Braudel’s discussion of ‘money and credit’ as 
techniques that “become inherited and are inevitably passed down 
through example and experience” (Braudel, 1981: 477). It is time to recall 
that “[t]he higher the level of civilization attained by a people and the 
more specialized the production of each economizing individual 
becomes, the wider become the foundations for economic exchanges” 
(Menger, 1981: 239). What is self-evident is that Menger’s evolutionary 
approach is truly akin to that of Braudel:  
The techniques of money, like any other techniques, are therefore a 
response to express, insistent and often-repeated demand. The more 
developed an economy became, the wider the range of monetary 
instruments and credit facilities it employed (Braudel, 1981: 477).  
The techniques of money, like any other techniques (such as those of 
markets, market economy, law, state, etc.), emerge in a spontaneously 
interconnected mode, and eventually culminate into social routines over 
time. In this sense, such techniques form social institutions, which come 
into existence as a response to the limits of the possible within the 
structures of everyday life.  
Apart from the spontaneous origin of markets and monies, there 
seems to be another similarity between Austrians and Braudel as to the 
nature of a ‘market economy.’ While demonstrating that market 
economies existed well before the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
Braudel’s indication is that the market resembles a process: 
Historically, one can speak of a market economy … when prices in 
the markets of a given area fluctuate in unison, a phenomenon the 
more characteristic since it may occur over a number of different 
jurisdictions or sovereignties. … Prices have fluctuated since ancient 
times; by the twelfth century they were fluctuating in unison 
throughout Europe. Later on, this concord became more precise 
within ever stricter limits. Even the tiny villages of the Eaucigny in 
the eighteenth-century Savoy, a high mountain region where 
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communication is difficult, saw prices go up and down, from one 
week to the next, on all the markets in the area according to harvests 
and needs, in other words supply and demand (Braudel, 1982: 227-8, 
emphases added).  
The distinctive characteristic of the market economy, in this account, 
can be interpreted to be the harmonious fluctuation of prices.20 Harmony 
as such is reminiscent of converging, rather than equilibrating, prices. At 
this point, one can recollect the Austrian conception of the market as a 
discovery process, through which prices converge towards equilibrium. 
The Austrians always emphasize the search for equilibrium rather than 
the equilibrium itself. Interestingly, this is more-or-less how Braudel 
perceives the operation of a market economy: “In an overall structure 
which had an obstinate tendency towards a routine balance, and which 
left it only to revert to it, this [is] the zone of change and innovation” 
(Braudel, 1982: 25). Presumably, the use of a strong adjective like 
‘obstinate’ to characterize the tendency of the market towards equilibrium 
is to point out that the market leaves the state of equilibrium for tiny 
intervals of time so as to revert to it immediately. However, unless such 
deviations from equilibrium were extremely frequent, Braudel would not 
single out the market as the ‘zone of change and innovation.’ Therefore, 
like the Austrians, his foremost emphasis is directed towards the dynamic 
nature of the search towards the routine balance rather than the ‘routine 
balance’ itself. Indeed: 
[T]he market complex can only be understood when it is replaced 
within the context of an economic life and no less a social life that 
changes over the years; and secondly that this complex is itself 
constantly evolving and changing; it never has the same meaning or 
significance from one minute to the next (Braudel, 1982: 224).   
Consequently, Braudel’s authoritative inquiry into economic history 
tends to reveal that Austrian economics provides us with a serviceable set 
of conceptions regarding not only the spontaneous emergence and 
evolution of markets and money, but also the essence of the dynamic 
market processes. If Austrian economics can break its a prioristic mould 
so as to approve the use of empirics, it seems that Braudel’s three-volume 
magnum opus utilized in this study may well serve as a constructive 
                                                 
20 For Braudel, not only perfect monetary economies constitute true market economies. His 
emphasis is on the fluctuation of prices insofar as a definition of a ‘market economy’ is 
required. While discussing Colonial America, Braudel regards particular geographies (such 
as Mexico, Peru, West Indies and Brazil) as imperfect monetary economies. “But prices in 
them did fluctuate–already a sign of a certain economic maturity–whereas up to the 
nineteenth century prices did not fluctuate in either Argentina or Chile (which nevertheless 
produced copper and silver). Here they remained remarkably steady, having been so to speak 
stifled at birth” (Braudel, 1981: 445-6).  
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departure point. However, whether the Austrians can find support from 
Braudel in terms of their categorical pro-marketism remains to be seen.   
3.2. Market economy and capitalism as exact opposites 
Austrians have consistently shown up as uncompromising opponents 
of socialism and advocates of a free market system. Socialism entails 
central planning as opposed to the market system of capitalism. For the 
Austrians, inasmuch as central planning lacks a freely operating price 
mechanism, it can by no means translate tacit market knowledge into 
informative signals. In this sense, a ‘market system under capitalism’ is 
superior to ‘central planning under socialism’, whereas the former and the 
latter are conceived as exact opposites by the Austrians. Here, there is a 
crucial implication that must be emphasized. In the Austrian context, 
‘central planning’ and ‘socialism’ are more-or-less the same thing. Much 
more crucially, and more often than not, Austrians also consider the 
‘market economy’ and ‘capitalism’ the same thing. This Austrian 
viewpoint becomes crystal clear in a passage where Mises accentuates the 
spiky distinction between the market economy and socialism:  
The market economy must be strictly differentiated from the second 
thinkable—although not realizable—system of social cooperation 
under the division of labor: the system of social or governmental 
ownership of the means of production. This second system is 
commonly called socialism, communism, planned economy, or state 
capitalism. The market economy or capitalism, as it is usually called, 
and the socialist economy preclude one another (Mises, 1963: 258, 
emphases added). 
The seeming peace between the Austrians and Braudel comes to an 
end precisely at this point. Braudel’s analysis yields that market economy 
is one thing, and capitalism quite another. In Braudel’s three-storey 
edifice, the middle floor corresponds to the transparent market economy 
characterized by free and fair competition, whereas the top-layer of 
capitalism makes its abode from speculation and calculation. Rather than 
a simple categorical demarcation, Braudel, by means of his grand 
research program, arrives at a sharp difference between the very 
mentalities involved in the market economy and capitalism: 
In this confrontation between model and observation, I found myself 
constantly faced with a regular contrast between a normal and often 
routine exchange economy (what the eighteenth century would have 
called the natural economy) and a superior, sophisticated economy 
(which would have been called artificial). I am convinced that this 
distinction is tangible that the agents and men involved, the actions 
and mentalities, are not the same in these different spheres; and that 
the rules of the market economy regarding, for instance, free 
competition as described in classical economics, although visible at 
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some levels, operated far less frequently in the upper sphere, which 
is that of calculations and speculation. At this level, one enters a 
shadowy zone, a twilight area of activities by the initiated which I 
believe to lie at the very root of what is encompassed by the term 
capitalism: the latter being an accumulation of power (one that bases 
exchange on the balance of strength, as much as, or more than on the 
reciprocity of needs) a form of social parasitism which, like so many 
other forms, may or may not be inevitable (Braudel, 1982: 22).  
The first implication of this difference between the market economy 
and capitalism is as follows: While spontaneous emergence of markets 
out of social necessity (i.e., out of the unsustainability of self-sufficiency) 
is quite reasonable an inference from Braudel’s scheme, the same may 
not be true for his conception of the ‘world-economies’ that are built up 
at the level of nations as well as at a world-scale. Indeed, “it would be 
more accurate to think of the market economy as being built up step by 
step” (Braudel, 1982: 228). The transformation from the middle 
(economic life) towards the top storey (capitalism) is more likely to 
involve human calculation rather than spontaneity. The higher interface 
corresponds to the ‘commanding heights’ where capitalists hold the keys 
to long-distance trade and communication networks. Being “sufficiently 
informed and materially able to choose the sphere of its action”, the 
typical capitalist, regularly and quite consciously, has been able to “bend 
the rules of the market economy” (Braudel, 1982: 400-1). In other words, 
it is the very mentality of capitalism “to direct and control change in 
such a way as to preserve its hegemony.” Natural operation of the market 
economy is invariably and inevitably accompanied by an artificially 
capitalist influence on the way to the establishment of nation- and world-
wide market economies. Therefore, a crucial warning to Austrians 
logically follows: Some phenomena may owe their existence to complex 
natural processes involving no human calculation and design, but some 
powerful circles are prone to engage in truly artificial practices to 
paralyze the natural or spontaneous orders. The agents within such 
powerful circles are commonly called ‘capitalists’ in Braudel’s analysis!  
Capitalism is a shadowy zone, where exchanges are based on the 
‘accumulation of power’ among capitalists themselves, and against the 
market economy vertically downwards. The transparent market 
economy, however, operates on the ‘reciprocity of needs’ between 
producers and consumers, and between savers and investors. Within this 
setting, capitalism and market economy are not only different from each 
other, but also exact opposites (Braudel, 1982: 22). To be clearer, the 
market economy comes “with its many horizontal communications 
between the different markets: here a degree of automatic coordination 
usually links supply, demand and prices” (Braudel, 1982: 230, emphases 
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added). Free and fair competition prevails in the framework of “a normal 
and often routine exchange economy.” On the other side, the artificial 
economy of capitalism is more sophisticated:  
Then alongside, or rather above this layer [i.e., above the market 
economy], comes the zone of the anti-market, where the great 
predators roam and the law of the jungle operates. This—today as in 
the past, before and after the industrial revolution—is the real home 
of capitalism (Braudel, 1982: 230, emphases added).  
This major aspect of Braudel’s work is in sharp contrast with the 
Austrian viewpoint. Braudel’s analysis is indicative of the impossibility 
of ‘pure’ laissez-faire. ‘Let them do, let them pass’ may well be 
interpreted as follows: let capitalists stampede on the market as they 
please! Put differently, if the capitalist mode of action is not controlled or 
regulated, capitalists tend to give up competing, and engage in 
monopolistic practices. Laissez-faire relies on competition, but 
competition can be maintained only through regulation of and control 
over the market:  
Price control … has always existed and still exists today. … In 
theory, severe control over the market was meant to protect the 
consumer, that is competition. One might go so far as to say that it 
was the ‘free’ market, such as the 'private marketing' phenomenon in 
England, that tended to do away with both control and competition 
(Braudel, 1982: 227).  
At this point, one may identify two opposing functions of the state in 
Braudel’s analysis: “the state as regulator, as protector of ‘competition’” 
and “the state as ‘guarantor’ of the very monopolies” (Wallerstein, 1991: 
360). In this sense, it is the capitalist mentality per se that has preferred 
and still prefers to get rid of the true free market by way of converting the 
‘regulator state’ into a ‘guarantor state.’ In order to “bend the rules of the 
market economy” (so that they can engage in hugely profitable 
businesses in terms of a concentration into monopolistic structures), what 
capitalists badly need is ‘unchecked’ markets. So long as the capitalist 
mentality prevails over the market economy, true competition can by no 
means be maintained without genuine intervention. In this connection, it 
would be interesting to carry out a mental exercise as to what Adam 
Smith would think of Braudel’s analysis. To be sure, Smith had lived at a 
time when it was somewhat early to directly pronounce such terms as 
‘capitalist’, ‘capitalism’ or ‘capitalist mentality.’ However, only after we 
take Braudel’s standpoint seriously, only then can we find that, in the 
following excerpt, the father of economics was telling about a mentality 
of a similar family: 
The interest of the dealers … in any particular branch of trade or 
manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and even 
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opposite to, that of the publick. To widen the market and to narrow 
the competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the 
market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the 
publick; but to narrow the competition must always be against it, and 
can only serve to enable dealers, by raising their profits above what 
they would normally be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax 
upon the rest of their fellow-citizens (Smith, 1976, Vol. 1.: p. 267). 
3.3. By way of conclusion: Money under capitalism  
While Braudel defines a market economy in terms of harmonious 
fluctuation of prices, he identifies capitalism with its ability to adapt to 
varying circumstances:   
Let me emphasize the quality that seems to me to be an essential 
feature of the general history of capitalism: its unlimited flexibility, 
its capacity for change and adaptation. If there is, as I believe, a 
certain unity in capitalism, from thirteenth-century Italy to present-
day West, it is here above all that such unity must be located and 
observed (Braudel, 1982: 433).  
But where on earth has capitalism been able to find the tool to 
preserve its unity for about seven centuries until today? How was it so 
successful to adjust and by means of what? Braudel gives us the hint:  
The more developed an economy became, the wider the range of 
monetary instruments and credit facilities it employed. And in the 
wider international unity that money represented on a world scale, 
each society had its place, some favored, some backward, some 
heavily handicapped. Money gave a certain unity to the world, but it 
was the unity of injustice (Braudel, 1981: 477, emphases added). 
Capitalism as a historical system exhibited a protracted survival 
thanks to the utilization of money as a ‘power pivot.’ The role of money 
in the market economy is to serve to the ‘reciprocity of needs’ as a 
medium of exchange that facilitates and accelerates transparent and 
competitive transactions. However, money under capitalism turns out to 
be a tool of ‘power accumulation’ to be employed in large-scale 
businesses and long-distance transactions, which yield reward in the form 
of speculative monopolistic profits. But, how were the capitalists time-
and-again so successful in maintaining their hierarchical superiority to 
shape their sphere of action at will, presumably oftentimes at the expense 
of the non-capitalists? Interestingly enough, the search for an answer to 
this question brings about another difference between Braudel and the 
Austrians. 
In the light of Braudel’s analysis, one may argue that the transparent 
market with fair and free competition (i.e., without capitalism) actually 
harbors a reasonable level of uncertainty. Austrian insistence that 
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speculation is a virtual ability diffused within the context of market 
process becomes trivial in Braudel’s scheme. Once the abode of 
speculation and calculation is singled out as capitalism (i.e., the anti-
market), the Austrian attribution of uncertainty to the market ceases to be 
valid. At least some market knowledge is not tacit. However, it is 
rendered tacit by the very capitalistic practices. Even since the 15th 
century, capitalists have been able to manipulate the status quo in 
accordance with their interests. Converting the ‘regulator state’ into a 
‘guarantor state’, capitalists have always managed to get rid of control 
and competition while establishing a coalition with the state power. In 
turn, they were incessantly successful in bending the ‘spontaneous’ rules 
of the fairly and freely competitive market economy through converting 
competition into monopolistic and privileged practices; thus through 
converting the legible market data into the ‘tacit’ knowledge of the 
privileged few:  
In the course of this book, the reader will have noticed that reference 
is often made to the underlying notion of gambling, risk-taking, 
cheating; the rule of the game was to invent a counter-game, to 
oppose the regular mechanisms and instruments of the market, in 
order to make it work differently–if not in the opposite direction 
(Braudel, 1982: 578).    
In this respect, the market economy under capitalism has hardly ever 
been a true process of discovery for all participants. By using money as a 
means of coercion at the commanding heights, capitalists have invented 
their own native language, which the ‘true’ market process could never 
understand and translate:  
[C]urrencies are languages…: they make dialogue both necessary 
and possible and they only exist when the dialogue itself exists. … 
To hold a conversation one has to find a common language, some 
common ground. The merit of long-distance trade, of large-scale 
commercial capitalism, was its ability to speak the language of the 
world trade. … Long-distance trade was the source of all rapid 
‘accumulation’. It controlled the world of the ancien régime and 
money was at its command, following or preceding it as necessary … 
Money too is a means of exploiting someone else, at home or abroad 
… (Braudel, 1981: 440-1).  
Hence, the market as a discovery process could never be as superior 
as Austrians supposed. However, the state has usually been against the 
market, as the Austrians rightly insisted. But, interventionism as such has 
been against the market not because of a tendency for central planning; 
but because of state’s being usually hand-in-hand with capitalism. Under 
these circumstances, the market system under capitalism implies a 
refracted conversion of individual self-interests into social-well being. 
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Indeed, the market has usually implied the maintenance of capitalistic 
privileges. As we argued elsewhere (Özveren and Özçelik, 2001), the 
market is like a neutral container. What it actually contains under the 
capitalist regime is a set of economic power differentials. Such 
differentials are dictated to the market process prior to the operation of 
the process. The market thus continues to reproduce such differentials.  
Consequently, an irony with respect to Braudel and the Austrians 
deserves to be the concluding paragraph. For Braudel, the distinction 
between the market and capitalism finds expression in the sharp contrast 
between the natural and the artificial; indeed, between the good and the 
bad. For the Austrians, however, capitalism is almost the mirror image of 
the natural and spontaneous market process. In the final analysis, thus, 
Braudel would not reject the Austrian motto that spontaneity is superior 
to human design. Of course, it matters a great deal what is truly natural 
and what is not.    
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Özet 
İktisadi liberalizmin farklı bir eleştirisi: Fernand Braudel’in ışığında 
Avusturya Okulu’nu yeniden değerlendirmek  
Avusturya iktisat okulu ‘kapitalizm’ ile ‘piyasa ekonomisi’ni özdeşleştirme 
eğilimindedir. Bu okulun tanınmış bir üyesi bir zamanlar şu uyarıyı dile getirmişti: 
“İnsanların kapitalizmi küçümseyip hor görmesiyle ve hoşlanmadıkları her şeyi 
‘kapitalist’ diye nitelemesiyle ilintili psikolojik sorun … tarihin ilgi alanına girer ve 
tarihçilere bırakılmalıdır.” “Tarihin Papası”nın başyapıtını, yani Fernand Braudel’in 
Uygarlık ve Kapitalizm’ini okuyup anlamak için tarih uzmanı olmaya gerek yok. 
Braudel’in tüm ayrıntıları göz önüne alarak geliştirdiği tarihsel çözümleme, şaşırtıcı bir 
sonuca ulaşır: Kapitalizm ve piyasa ekonomisi ‘zıt kutuplar’dır. Kapitalistler, herkesin 
kolayca anlayabileceği piyasa verilerini ayrıcalıklı bir azınlığın yararlanabileceği ‘örtük’ 
bilgiye dönüştürmek için piyasanın ‘spontane’ kurallarını her zaman tahrif etmiştir. 
Sonuçta, ‘para’, basit bir değişim aracı olmaktan çok, bir ‘güç’ ekseni olarak kullanılmış; 
‘piyasa süreci’ ise bireysel çıkarları toplumsal yarara dönüştürmekten çok, servet/güç 
farklılıklarını çoğaltmak durumunda kalmıştır. Bu yorumumuz liberal iktisadi düşünceye 
büsbütün yeni bir görünüm kazandırmaktadır.  
